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RESTRICTED 
SEA POWER IS WORLD POWER 
An article by 
Commander George H. Miller, U. S. Navy 
As the United States stands on the threshold of what may one 
day be known as her Golden Age it might be well for us to look back 
over the road which has led our country to its present position of 
world leadership. Today we are the most powerful nation on earth, 
and there is little doubt that much of the credit for this growth can 
be laid to our fortunate geographic position. Situated between 
two great oceans, the United States is unmistakably a maritime 
power. Our forefathers, who crossed the seas to found our na­
tion, were seafaring people. They derived their living from the 
sea, and it is because of the sea that our nation grew and pros­
pered. The seas have given us security and economic stability, 
and these two elements are wholly related, one to the other. 
As we grew, we enjoyed the tacit protection of the British 
Navy. And it was because of the maternalistic attitude, and pos­
sibly the preoccupation, of the British that we were permitted to 
use the seas without having to pay our way. In other words we 
were given a free ride by the British Navy. For example, we pro­
pounded the Monroe Doctrine and were able, by obtaining the sup­
port of the British, to make it stick. Later we built a great fleet of 
clipper ships without having to bear the expense of a huge navy to 
protect them. In World War I, we were able to fight an overseas 
war chiefly because the British Fleet was there to run interference 
for us. 
Between World War I and World War II we were able to 
build a tactical navy designed to defeat the Japanese Fleet in a 
Commander Miller is a member of the Staff of the President, 
Naval War College. 
1 
1
Miller: Sea Power is World Power
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
fleet action. During. this period all our talent was devoted to the 
problem of defeating the Japanese Fleet in the Pacific, while in 
the Atlantic our thinking went very little beyond the Neutrality 
Patrol. As for the rest -of the world, we let the British worry 
about that; So lo:p.g as the British looked out for things else-
where we did not have to think seriously about problems pf maritime 
strategy--or global strategy. 
Thus our navy was a tactical navy, superbly trained and, 
we believed, ready to fight. Fleet training and fleet readiness were 
given top priority. They were our primary· objectives in our peace-
time training for war. 
Today we face a different situation.. The British are un­
able to carry their former share of the load. We in the United 
States are finding it necessary to assume more and more of the 
responsibility for world stability. And so if anyone is going to 
do any serious thinking about the uses and implications of sea 
power it must be the United States. 
It is because of our unchallenged position as the dominant 
sea power that we are today the greatest power on the face of 
the earth. It is because of this control of the seas that we are 
able to exert our influence in most of the important areas of the 
earth. And in case of war sea power places at our disposal most 
of the resources, the populations, and the industrial capacity of the 
world. We need only look at the Globe to remind ourselves that 
wherever the oceans touch the shores, the United States exerts a 
powerful influence for world stability. Consequently, so long as 
we control the seas, our frontiers, unlike those of a land power, lie 
acrqss the seas rather than at our own borders. 
Now we are witnessing an amazing paradox. Here is a na­
tion, born and brought up by the sea, a nation which is today one 
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of the greatest sea powers the world has ever known; and her 
people are beginning to forget it. Why has this happened? 
One reason for this apparent confusion of thought is the 
fact that we are in the midst of an industrial revolution. In the 
last hundred years, civilization has advanced further in the techni­
cal field than it has in all previous recorded history. We have 
moved so fast that our military thinking has not been able to 
keep pace with the development of new weapons. We are tend­
ing to become so preoccupied with the technical aspects of warfare 
that our strategic thinking suffers. 
In the midst of this technical advance, we find the British 
forced to relinquish their position as the dominant sea power. We 
in the Navy were just not ready for the task that was thereby 
handed to us. Up to this time, we had always been a tactical 
Navy, free to occupy ourselves with our own little problems, while 
the British worried about the rest of the world. Fleet training 
and fleet readiness have always taken priority over higher education 
in naval strategy. As a result, we do not have in our Navy or 
in our country today any sizeable group of recognized naval 
strategists. We have never really needed these strategic thinkers 
until now; and we just do not have them. 
We have a wealth of technical experts who have no equal 
in any other nation. We have aviation specialists, amphibious 
specialists, submarine specialists, anti-submarine specialists, atomic 
energy specialists, and electronic specialists, but we just do not have 
enough people with a clear understanding of sea power and mari­
time strategy. Without such understanding these many elements of 
military power cannot be properly integrated into a pattern of 
national security. 
Along with our rapid technical development there has grown 
up among our people a sincere desire to turn from considerations 
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of national security to the more constructive pursuits of peace. 
There has been a natural tendency to look around for a simple 
formula by which our national security problems could be solved. 
Some have suggested that the simple solution to our problem lies 
in the large-scale use of the atomic bomb. We recognize in this 
proposal the theory of the blitzkrieg, the quick, easy victory idea, 
that has always seemed so attractive to the uninformed. It is 
the old land-power concept of the "putsch", which depends so 
much on being able to obtain the quick surrender of the enemy. 
But if the enemy fails to surrender according to plan, the blitz­
krieg fails, and the attacker is faced with a totally different kind of 
a war, a kind for which he is not prepared. He finds himself fight­
ing the kind of war the enemy wants to fight, and the result in 
this case could very well be final def eat. 
And thus today we are attempting to solve our national se,. 
curity problems through poorly conceived concepts, rather than 
through a clear understanding of geography and strategy. We as 
a nation are attempting to ignore the very existence of three­
quarters of the surface of the earth-the seas, by which we have 
grown to our present position of world power. 
The truth of the matter is that we in the Armed Forces have 
stood by while these unsound concepts were being pressed. We 
simply did not have the people who understood the significance 
of the seas to our national life well enough to spell it out for the 
American people. 
We can go even one step further. In some instances, we in 
the Navy have helped promote these false concepts. During the con­
fusion that followed the initial use of atomic weapons, there were 
those in our own service who came forward to assert that from now 
on wars would be fought exclusively below the surface of the seas, 
or in the skies. And there was one of our wartime captains who is 
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reputed to have said, "I am retiring because there is no longer 
any need for a navy." 
As a result of our failure to keep our thinking abreast of 
new developments the American people are beginning to lose sight 
of the vital significance of the sea areas of the world to their na­
tional security and prosperity. There is a growing tendency to turn 
from the sea and to accept the far more costly security measures 
peculiar to land powers. Some current concepts, instead of wel­
coming and exploiting to the fullest the free, easy road of the sea, 
seek to avoid its use. Yet, by the very facts of geography we are 
a maritime power. To reach the rest of the world in peace or in 
war, we must first cross the seas; for others to reach us they, too, 
must first cross the seas. 
In peace and in war the maritime power holds a tremendous 
economic advantage over the land power. The significant phen­
omenon of sea power is that we can build a huge tub, or hull, 
and float it on the surface of the water; It floats by itself; it 
requires no power to keep it afloat. This huge tub can be filled 
with cargo-or bombs, or airplanes, or soldiers-and with relatively 
little power can be moved to almost any point on the surface of the 
earth. There are no rail or road beds to maintain, no mountains to 
cross, no tunnels to dig. And as our civilization continues to de­
velop more ways will be found to use this cheap, easy road of the 
sea. 
Water transportation is by far the most economical means 
of transportation known to Man. By conservative estimate it is 
two times as economical as land transportation and thirty-four times 
as economical as air transportation. To take a specific example, 
one oil company estimates that it costs twenty times as much to 
transport petroleum products by rail as it does by water. Thus the 
cost of transporting petroleum products by air would be over three 
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hundred times the cost by water. When we realize that our overseas 
transportation during five years of the past war amounted to ap­
proximately 676 billion ton-miles and that about two thirds of this 
total consisted of petroleum products we can readily see the eco­
nomic advantage of gearing our war and peacetime transportation 
to the sea. 
War is fundamentally a problem of transportation, the prob­
lem of transporting weapons-whether they be in the form of 
bombs, projectiles or bayonets-to the point where they will exert 
the greatest influence on the enemy. It would therefore seem pru­
dent that we plan, in the event of war, to transport our weapons 
as close as possible to our objective by sea, shifting to more expen­
sive means of transportation only when sufficient resistance de­
velops to prevent further movement by water. By projecting our 
air forces and ground forces at the end of sea lines of communica­
tion a smaller percentage of the national wealth is expended for 
transportation. For every dollar expended for our military estab­
lishment we would thereby assure ourselves of more hitting power 
at the point of contact with the enemy. In order to assure our­
selves of the tremendous advantages inherent in water transporta­
tion it therefore seems reasonable that our primary national ob­
jective in peace or in war is to maintain control of the seas. Any 
threat to this control should be considered as the major threat to 
our national security. 
What steps are we taking to clarify our thinking on the 
subject of sea power? Even today there are few in our Navy, or 
in the country at large, who see the critical need for a serious 
study of sea power and naval strategy. There are few who real-
. ize that a basic understanding of sea power is a matter of grave 
concern to every citizen of the United States. For the day we as a 
nation relinquish our supremacy on the seas is the day we begin 
our decline. 
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Today there are relatively fe:w in the Navy who fully un­
derstand the implications of sea power. Before we can carry this 
message to the other services and to the people of the United 
States we must first educate ourselves. Unless the study of sea 
power is pursued vigorously and continuously with the best minds 
available in the country we cannot expect to maintain our dominat­
ing position in the world. This is a matter of immediate concern 
to the people of the United States. The best talent and the best 
equipment in the country must be made available to work on the 
problem of maintaining our position on the seas. 
The study of sea power and naval strategy is an under­
taking that should be given the highest priority. It is a project as 
urgent as the study and development of anti-submarine warfare, 
guided missiles, or atomic energy. Unless our strategic thinking 
is the best in the world all the new weapons we are developing can­
not save us. 
The case for sea power was never so strong as it is today. 
It is the single factor governing our present position as a World 
Power. The implications of sea power for our future go far beyond 
anything we can now comprehend. We in the Navy must be the 
first to recognize and understand this fact. 
We Americans might also remind ourselves that it is not in­
evitable that the United States maintain indefinitely her present 
position of world supremacy; we are not immune to decadence. For 
even though our scientific progress has been nothing short of re­
markable, we are not a race of supermen. Nor are we specially en­
dowed with some supernatural immunity from human error. We as 
a nation are vulnerable to the same error, the same pitfalls as are 
other communities of human beings. 
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History is filled with the epitaphs of nations which, though 
blessed with favorable maritime positions, chose to turn their backs 
on the sea. We hold in our own hands the destiny of our country; 
and in our minds lay the seeds of our own destruction. The quality 
of our strategic thinking today may well deter�ine whether the 
life of these United States will be measured in centuries-or in 
decades. 
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